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Gonshorek: Crisis After Dole: The Plight Of Modern Homeworkers

NOTE

CRISIS AFTER DOLE: THE PLIGHT OF
MODERN HOMEWORKERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 1989, in ILGWU v. Dole', the District Court

for the District of Columbia rescinded the ban that had barred
homeworkers from producing certain goods within their own homes2
and replaced it with a certification system.' A homeworker is defined
generally as "someone working in or from the home for an employer
or contractor who supplies the work .

though often homework-

ers work within their own homes. 5 The Dole court was concerned
with those homeworkers involved in seven specific apparel-related in-

dustries 6 because those industries are ones laden with prior employer
1. 729 F. Supp. 877 (D.D.C. 1989).
2. Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 888.
3. Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 885. This system requires employers who use homeworkers to
register with the Department of Labor. Id. The renewal time is every two years. Id. Among
the requirements for this system are lists of employees to be given to the Department of Labor,
handbooks used for records, and written certificates which ensure that the employer will abide
by regulations and the system's processes. Id.
4. Ewing, Homeworking: A Frameworkfor Reform, II INDus. L.J. 94, 95 (1982).
5. A more general definition is that found in statutes. A homeworker is "any employee
employed or suffered or permitted to perform industrial homework for an employer." 29
C.F.R. § 530.1 (b)(1989). " 'Industrial homework'. . . means the production by any person in
or about a home, apartment, tenement, or room in a residential establishment of goods for an
employer .... " 29 C.F.R. § 530.1 (c)(1989).
6. See Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 878. The seven industries are: women's apparel, "nonhaz-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

1

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 4
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol, 8:1

violations.7 Another concern of the Dole court was that homeworkers
usually belong to one or more of the following categories and are
consequently easily exploited: poor or lower-class; female; minorities;
undocumented aliens; and/or residents of rural areas of the United
States.8 Nevertheless, the Dole court held that the overall ban on
these industries was to be replaced by the certification system, believing it to be the only "reasoned decision" to an overall ban on the
existence of these workers.'
Unions and feminists believe that the lifting of the ban will diminish the power of these workers as part of the workforce and as
part of society, as well as frustrate any efforts to achieve improved
working conditions for regular workers. Unions fear that these nonunionized workers, often working for below-minimum wages,10 will
greatly undermine any collective bargaining agreements which the
union may seek with an employer." Also, unions realize that employers use these homeworkers "as a buffer against fluctuations in
demand . . . [and] as a means of cutting overheads, saving factory

space, and improving competitiveness."" 2 Consequently, the Department of Labor (hereinafter "DOL") may have inadvertently persuaded employers to comply with the certification system not so that
the homeworkers may enjoy both the convenience of work in their
homes and the DOL's supervision, but so that the employers may
capitalize on the opportunity presented by these workers who help to
ardous" jewelry, handkerchiefs, belts and buckles, embroidery, gloves and mittens, and knitted
outerwear. Id. There have been numerous legal conflicts and inconsistencies concerning exactly

what homeworkers can make; the making of boxer shorts and athletic gloves has been held to
be legal, while the manufacturing of ladies' panties and work gloves has been held to be illegal.
Boris, The Exploitation of Industrial Workers in Their Homes, 62 Bus. & REv. 27, 28

(1987).
7. Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 879-81.
8. Boris, supra note 6, at 28-29. There have also been suggestions that workers not
involved in the safer, more protected trades, such as knitting or embroidery, are prone to be

exploited. Id. at 28. This exploitation occurs because undocumented aliens often perform the
more dangerous tasks, such as needle-work, as they work in sweatshop atmospheres all day and

then work at home at night for extra money and the opportunity to keep a second job. Id.
9.
10.

Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 888.
See, e.g., ILGWU v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 802 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820

(1984) (stating that, in a sample group studied for the case, the average wage for such workers

was twenty-seven cents per hour, less than eighty percent of the minimum wage).
11. See, e.g., McGrath, Sweatsuits Today, Sweatshops Tomorrow, 16 STUDENT LAW.
38 (Dec. 1987). "[Unions] accuse manufacturers of employing home workers precisely to

avoid paying minimum wages, overtime, workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, Social Security, health insurance, vacations, and sick pay." Id. at 40. Consequently, a union's
demands may be met with the realization that those same employers will now turn to homeworkers over unionized workers to avoid the costs of organized labor.
12. Ewing, supra note 4, at 95.
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cut many overhead costs and who provide the cheap labor which
many employers so easily exploit. This loss of influence in the
workforce is deplored by feminists, who believe that women as homeworkers perpetuate their own inferior roles not only in the workforce,
but in the societal and domestic spheres as well.' 3
A strong resistance to these arguments are those shared by the
Reagan Administration in the 1980's, which spurred on the inception
of the certification system and its popular place as the only alternative to an otherwise unpopular ban on homeworkers. Though the federal government of the 1940's was responsible for the original passing of the Fair Labor Standards Act 4 (hereinafter "FLSA"), an act
designed to protect homeworkers,' 5 the federal government of the
1980's believed it could better promote free enterprise and lively7
competition,' 6 as well as revitalize an innocent "cottage industry,"'
if the bans were lifted. The workers themselves are often advocates
of the certification system by claiming that, if they choose to work
under certain fixed conditions and rates, then they deserve to be paid
the agreed-upon amount and to be left alone.' 8 Consequently, the
conflict is three-fold and lies at the very heart of all labor laws and
policies: the right of the employer to continue in a free enterprise
system versus the protection of workers against employer violations,
both limited by the social policies which attempt to accommodate
the workforce but also to protect the workplace.
The Dole decision, and the survival of the certification system as
the alternative to a complete ban on homeworkers, are best explained and interpreted as the inevitable result of a long chain of
preceding judicial decisions, legislative enactments, and public policies which popularized this system and presented it as the only ac13. See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 11, at 40 (claiming that many homeworkers must
use child care in order to complete work at home, and those workers who do not have child

care often work exhaustive overtime hours to remain on their proper work schedules); Boris,
supra note 6, at 28 (stating that homework "pushes both parts of the double day into the home

without relieving women of childcare or housework."). Contra Boris, supra note 6, at 28 (quoting a homeworker who received above minimum-wages and saved everyday work expenses

while simultaneously caring for her family and still earning money).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 202 et seq. (1988).
15. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
16. See Boris, supra note 6, at 28 (suggesting that the government believes that the
system will release capitalism and great business competition).
17. See Boris, supra note 6, at 28. The cottage industry is "an industry based upon the
family unit as a labor force in which workers using their own equipment at home process goods
." WEBSTER's THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986).
18. See McGrath, supra note 11, at 38. "If someone's satisfied, no matter how much
they're making, the government shouldn't be able to come in and say they can't have the job
and then take the jobs from us." Id. (quoting a seamstress-homeworker).
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ceptable judicial outcome of this conflict. 19 The demise of the FLSA
itself, a statute wrought with good intentions but always troubled by
bureaucratic inadequacy and a decreasing workforce, 0 was an everfailing statute that enabled the legislature to avoid strict enforcement of the FLSA's original protective laws. Following this legislative demise, tax courts took affirmative steps to actually encourage
certain homeworkers, especially poor and single mothers, to work for
lower wages, accept the pay, and remain silent."' The demise of the
FLSA and the new tax laws of the 1980's created the snowball effect
that was perpetuated by incomplete health and safety acts, which
fail to protect homeworkers against employer negligence and hazards
in the workplace.2 2 It is no wonder that the certification system survived; the legislature and judiciary destroyed all other alternatives.
This Note aims to analyze the developments of the 1980's which
created the illusion that the certification system was the most effective answer to the plight of the homeworkers. This Note will analyze
the Dole decision and the certification system that is a result of this
case. The Note will then investigate the FLSA, a law originally
meant to protect homeworkers but deemed ineffective by the mid1980's. Tax laws which came about during the 1980's will also be
analyzed to see their influence upon this system. Moreover, this Note
will look at health statutes and the FLSA's language to determine
why homeworkers are bereft of any regulation save for the certification system. Finally, an attempt will be made to reform the system
so that, if the certifications must survive, their existence becomes effective and positive.
II.

A.

THE

Dole

DECISION

The National Industrial Recovery Act as a Prelude to the
FLSA

The background of the Dole decision actually began in
1930's with the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery
of 193323 (hereinafter "NIRA"). "Under the [NIRA], codes of
competition were drawn up for 556 industries, and provisions
19.

the
Act
fair
for

See infra parts III-VI.

20. See McGrath, supra note I1,at 39 (stating that, regardless of decades of regulations at both state and federal levels, homework in the seven apparel-related industries could
not be sufficiently regulated, and thus the FLSA could not be enforced).
21.
22.
23.

See infra notes 94-147 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 148-63 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. §§ 701-712 (repealed 1935).
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regulation or prohibition of homework were included in 118."24 Although Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that the demise of the NIRA
would "spell the return of industrial and labor chaos . . .25 the
NIRA was ultimately declared unconstitutional by the Supreme

Court in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 6 The
Court held that "the discretion of the President in approving or pre-

scribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade
and industry throughout the country

. . .

is an unconstitutional dele-

gation of legislative power. "27

Thereafter, the FLSA 28 was enacted, in part to alleviate the in-

tense pressure that erupted to keep homework banned.2 9 The FLSA
in part, established a piece-rate system.30 However, this system con-

31
tinued to present results of only mere wage-approximations, and

the system continued to be especially damaging to individual homeworkers.12 Ultimately, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Di-

primvision drew upon a prohibition of seven industries,3" and issued
34
workers.
of
unit
selected
a
to
certificates
itive homework
B.

The Certification System's Development as a System For

Homeworkers
Not until 1981 did a judicial problem arise with respect to the
ban on the seven industries. In 1981, the Secretary of Labor at24. ILGWU v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Included in these codes
of fair practice were requirements for minimum wage standards and the inference that there
had to be rates and effective enforcements in order for the Act to succeed. Nordlund, A Brief
History of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 39 LAB. L.J. 715, 719-20 (1988).
25. Nordlund, supra note 24, at 720 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt).
26. 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935).
27. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 542. Still,
[gireat gains were made where the codes prohibited the giving out of home work.
But in the industries in which home work was still permitted, even though limited
by certain regulations, the ancient evils continued to exist and to constitute a menace to the higher labor standards that had been achieved for factory workers.
Donovan, 722 F.2d at 800 (quoting U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, INDUSTRIAL HOMEWORK
UNDER THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 21 (1936)).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202-219 (1988).
29. Donovan, 722 F.2d at 801. See also infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
30. A piece-rate system is employed where "the price per unit of production [is] paid to
a pieceworker." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1712 (3d ed. 1986).
Thus, a worker is paid per each shirt stitched, etd.
31. Donovan, 722 F.2d at 803 (stating that factors such as different sized yarns and
stitches, and different worker productivity, deem the system inaccurate).
32. Id.
33. See supra note 6; see also 29 C.F.R. §516 & §530 (1989).
34. Donovan, 722 F.2d at 803-04. Among those allowed to work at home were those
with disability factors or those who were required to care for an invalid at home. Id. at 804.
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tempted to lift the ban on knitwear, a trade originally banned from
the home. 5 Nonetheless, the Court termed the Secretary's action
"arbitrary and capricious" and denied this effort to lift the ban
on
knitwear.36 In 1984, however, the DOL successfully issued the rule
for knitted outerwear,37 which allowed homeworkers to work in the
knitwear industry as long as their employers complied with a certification system. 38 Moreover, the DOL followed a substantial social
policy to enforce the regulation of this system. 9 Nonetheless, early
investigations insinuated that violations run rampant when legal
safeguards within an industry do not exist.4
The decision in ILGWU v. Dole4 allowed the certification system to extend to five separate industries other than the knitwear industry,42 a reaffirmation and extension of the 1984 ruling.43 Following the decision in ILGWU v. Donovan,"' the DOL was careful in its
attempts to modify the certification system and to be sure that the

system was supported by procedure and reason.45

35. See Donovan, 722 F.2d at 828.
36. Donovan, 722 F.2d at 826-28. This effort arose in part because the DOL used data
from Vermont knitters, who made more than minimum wage and clearly did not represent the
normal demographics of homeworkers. Donovan, 722 F.2d at 818-19.
37.

29 C.F.R. § 516 (1989).
38. Id.
39. "Since 1981 . . . the Department has given priority to investigating all complaints
received involving homework, has followed up on all leads regarding employment of homeworkers, and has actively sought to ensure that homework activity, wherever it occurs, is in
compliance with the FLSA." 53 Fed. Reg. 45707 (1989). Also, there were 1,928 investigations
of employers using homeworkers between October 1981 and September 1987. Id.
40. 1,183 of those violations found as a result of investigations were in unrestricted industries. Id.
41. 729 F. Supp. 877 (D.D.C. 1989).
42. See Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 888. The five industries are: gloves and mittens,
handkerchiefs, buttons and buckles, "nonhazardous" jewelry, and embroideries. Id. at 878. See
also 29 C.F.R. § 530.2. "No work in the industries defined in paragraphs (d) through (j) of §
530.1 shall be done in or about a home, apartment, tenement, or room in a residential establishment unless a special homework certificate issued and in effect pursuant to this part has
been obtained for each homeworker.
... Id.
43. See supra note 37.
44. 722 F.2d at 828.
45. "The Department believes that the homework ban has fostered an underground
economy beyond government control and that the certification program in knitted outerwear
improved FLSA enforcement ....
" Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 881 (citing from 53 Fed. Reg.
45715 (1989)). This caution was acknowledged also by the Dole court itself, which stated that
the Department had to conclude whether "certification for firms that come forward and meet
the requirements, accompanied by continuation of the ban for all other firms, is superior to the
total ban." Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 883.
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C. The Modern Certification System
The certification system as it currently exists was created in
part as a response to the concerns regarding homework which have

existed since the 1940's. Certification begins when the employer voluntarily applies for certification.4 6 This system places the employer

onto a list from which the DOL knows that the employer is using
homeworkers.47 Consequently, certification enables the homeworkers
to be identified. 48 Handbooks are also required to be kept by both

the employer and the homeworker to enable accurate record keeping
and knowledge of wage-hour regulations.4 9 "The new certification

program also requires employers to establish, through time studies or
other methods, 'piece rates' to better determine whether homework-

ers paid by the item are receiving the hourly minimum wage." 5 Finally, the employer's certification can be revoked for one to three
years upon discovery of a violation, 51 and new regulations include
53
civil monetary penalties 52 and the posting of "assurance" bonds.
Although the system appears substantial, the loopholes found
46. 53 Fed. Reg. 45722 (1989) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 530.102).
47. Id.
48. The employer must supply "It]he name and address of each such agent, distributor,
or contractor through whom homework is distributed or collected and the name and address of
" 29 C.F.R. § 516.31(b)(2)(1989).
each homeworker ..
49. [A] separate handbook (to be obtained by the employer from the Wage and
Hour Division and supplied by such employer to each worker) shall be kept for each
homeworker. The employer is required to insure that the hours worked and other
information required therein is entered by the homeworker when work is performed
and/or business-related expenses are incurred.
29 C.F.R. § 216.31(c)(1989). The employer must then record the hours worked and compute
the wages earned that day by each homeworker. Id. Furthermore, these handbooks call for
time sheets and were created to allow the DOL an accurate and efficient procedure by which
they may monitor employers and employees. 53 Fed. Reg. 45709 (1989). These handbooks will
be distributed according to certificates, which must be renewed every two years, and to lists
which must specify the names, addresses, and languages spoken by these workers. Id. See 29
C.F.R. §516.31(c)(1989); 53 Fed. Reg. 45722 (1989) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 530.102).
50. Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 885.
51. See Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 886. See also 29 C.F.R. § 530.7 (1989). "Violation of any
provision of the [FLSA] shall be sufficient grounds for revocation of all certificates issued to an
employer, in which event no certificates shall be issued to the offending employer for a period
of one year." Id. See 53 Fed. Reg. 45723 (1989) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 530.205(b)).
52. The new rules establish penalties for all violations (except child labor cases which
have their own penalties) and are assessed according to "the number of homeworkers affected,
the history of prior violations, whether a violation was intentional or knowing, whether a violation was substantial . . . and any mitigating or extenuating circumstances." 53 Fed. Reg.
45711(1989).
53. The DOL requires a bond to be posted when it has reasonable doubt that the employer will comply with the FLSA. Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 886. This bond is to assure back pay
to an employee who is a victim of a FLSA violation. Id. See 53 Fed. Reg. 45723 (1989)(to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 530.104(a)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

7

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 4
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 8:1

within the certification system, and the reasons given to answer these
loopholes, fail to save the system from remaining incomplete and ineffective. 4 A decreasing DOL workforce must continuously control
an increasing number of violations, 5 and the record-keeping remains
inaccurate. 56 Where the nature of the homework industry requires
workers to stay away from such public places as factories or warehouses, the individual aspect of the work may encourage a
homeworker's own isolation and the inefficiency of the certification
system.
Ill. THE FLSA

AND ITS DEMISE AS A HAVEN FOR LABOR

A.

The FLSA'S Inception

Though the overturn of the NIRA 57 would appear otherwise to
be the end of protected labor, the FLSA58 gathered its objectives
from the defeated NIRA. The FLSA was enacted primarily to
"achieve, in those industries within its scope, certain minimum labor
standards," 59 and to confront problems of child labor, 0 minimum
54. It is argued that the Final Rule creates the incentive for employers to provide the
government with a list of homeworkers, as well as with a list of employers who fail to comply
with this system. 53 Fed. Reg. 45719 (1989). Nonetheless, falsification of information is always possible. Id.
55. The DOL claims that twenty new employees have been added to monitor homeworkers. 53 Fed. Reg. 45720 (1989). Nonetheless, the DOL's staff had been cut by 11% by 1980.
McGrath, supra note I1,at 39.
56. There remains the inconvenience to the homeworkers of accurate record-keeping,
even with incentives. 53 Fed. Reg. 45710 (1989).
57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202-219 (1988).
59. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). The Act's
policy states that:
(a) [t]he Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1)causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among
the workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods
in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; (4)
leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods
in commerce. That Congress further finds that the employment of persons in domestic service in households affects commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
60. See Nordlund, supra note 24, at 721. "At the time the Act [FLSA] was passed, only
sixteen states had 16 years as the minimum age for factory employment. In three, the minimum was 15, in twenty-four it was 14, while eight states still permitted exceptions to be made
in the case of children under 14." Nordlund, supra note 24, at 721 (quoting Lumpkin, "The
Child Labor Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act", Law and Contemporary Problems,
Duke University Law School, Summer, 1939, p. 10).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss1/4

8

19901

Gonshorek: Crisis
After
Dole: The Plight Of Modern Homeworkers
Modern
Homeworkers

wages, 6 and overtime.62
Nonetheless, a virtual ban with highly restrictive exceptions was
placed onto the homework industry due to the FLSA's inability to
protect certain homeworkers. By 1943, seven apparel-related industries6 3 were areas "in which homework was most prevalent and in
which violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act had been a problem . . "64 Additionally,
[o]ne of the impediments to enforcement of minimum wages was
the difficulty of ascertaining the identity of homeworkers . . .
[and] [e]ven when workers could be identified, it was difficult to
obtain accurate records of the number of hours each employee had
worked, necessarily burdening efforts to ensure compliance with
minimum wage, maximum hours, and overtime provisions of the
Act.65
As a result, homework was banned except in situations that involved
the handicapped or disabled. 6 Consequently, the FLSA was a flailing statute only years after its inception.
B.

Amendments Change the Language and OriginalProtection of

the Act
Gradually, the FLSA lost most of its effectiveness6 7 as the gov61. Nordlund, supra note 24, at 721 (stating that the law proposed a 25-cent minimum
wage for those industries falling under its jurisdiction).
62. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of
his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce for a workweek longer than forty hours, unless such employee
receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a
rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate ....
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(1988).
63. See supra note 6.
64. Donovan, 722 F.2d at 801 (quoting the BRANCH OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, WAGE
& HOUR & PUBLIC CONTRACTS Div., DEPT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMEWORKERS
UNDER THE [FLSA] 15, 19 1959, reprinted in II J.A. 489, 493).
65. Donovan, 722 F.2d at 802. There existed four substantial barriers to the enforcement of FLSA. Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 879. The impediments were "the difficulty in identifying
homeworkers . . . [of] securing accurate records of hours worked at home . . . [of] detecting
and remedying FLSA violations with respect to homeworkers . . . [and] the lack of sufficient
resources to enforce the FLSA with respect to homeworkers." Id.
66. McGrath, supra note 11, at 39. The reason that the Department of Labor allowed
these exceptions was because these persons were home-bound and could receive special certification to work at home. Id.
67. Between 1938 and 1987, there were over 2.6 million actions taken by the Wage and
Hour Division to investigate on-site violations, and between 1951 and 1987, more than 6.6
million violations were found to exist because of minimum wage illegalities. Nordlund, supra
note 24, at 727. Furthermore, "[Congress] chose to rely on information and complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied. Plainly, effec-
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ernment repeatedly amended the statute to meet the specific needs of
special employers, employees, and the present societal policies. Since
1938, there have been six amendments to the FLSA.68 "Concurrent
with these initiatives there has been a persistent effort to limit coverage and single out industry segments or special categories of workers
for special consideration." 69 Congress enacted the 1961 amendment
to section 17, prohibiting "the restraint of any withholding of payment of minimum wages or overtime compensations found by the
court to be due to employees under this chapter .... "70 However,
the restraint was enacted more to prevent a violator from receiving
accruals in his favor than to award the workers for lost compensation, and to protect employers who comply with the FLSA from
those who do not.71 Thus, the FLSA was changed by Congress from
an Act for the people to an Act for employers.
In addition, section 16's amendment strips an employee of his
rights to sue for unpaid wages if the Secretary of Labor files and
seeks relief under section 217,72 taking away a right of the employee
who was supposedly protected under the Act. Finally, though section
202 strives to protect workers and their families by maintaining "the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers, ' 73 later sections were added over the
years to ensure the well-being of the employers who follow its
terms. 74 No longer an act created specifically for homeworkers, the
tive enforcement could thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with
their grievances." Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
68. Nordlund, supra note 24, at 724. Raising the minimum wage and changing the parameters of the FLSA's coverage are two primary reasons for the amendments. Id.

69. Id. Furthermore, the Act could then inconsistently cover one employer and not another, due to their locations of business, etc. S. Rep. No. 145, 87 Cong., Ist Sess., 2-3 (1961)
[hereinafter S. Rep. No. 145].
70. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1988).
71. See S. Rep. No. 145.
72. "The right provided by this subsection. . . shall terminate upon the filing of a com-

plaint by the Secretary of Labor in an action under Section 217 in which restraint is sought
."29 U.S.C. § 216(b)(1988).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)(1988).
74. See Hodgson v. Quezada, 498 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1974). The Hodgson court, in dis-

cussing the section 17 restraint, claims that section 17 "serves to increase the effectiveness of
the Act by depriving a violator of any gains resulting from his violation, and it protects those
employers who comply with the Act from unfair competition by those who do not comply."
Hodgson, 498 F.2d at 6 (emphasis added). See also Wirtz v. Malthor, Inc., 391 F.2d 1 (9th

Cir. 1968). The Wirtz district court believed that, because the violating business was small and
payment of back wages would have produced financial hardship, and because an injunction

served to protect against any future violations by this business, the repayment of back wages
was unnecessary. Wirtz, 391 F.2d at 2-3. Though the circuit court disagreed, its decision to
order back wages was based upon the fact that it is the employer who complies with the Act
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FLSA created no serious statutory impediment to lifting the ban on
homeworkers.
Moreover, by promoting free enterprise, 5 the government assured the DOL's victory. The government relied upon the FLSA's
ambiguous language that made it ineffective as early as 1943 and
weak against the big businesses of the 1980's; in effect, the government took advantage of a vague and confusing statute by using the
FLSA to assert that a certification system is a better alternative than
a total ban 6 and thus sent out the first signal that the homeworkers'
ban was subject to demise. The Act's original policy was to correct
exploitative labor conditions that were detrimental to commerce.
The Act then states in part that "[ijt is declared to be the policy of
this chapter.

. .

to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate

the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially curtailing employment or earning power."' 78 These two sections
are mutually exclusive, because any attempt to correct domestic service will intrude upon a boss' earning power, as employers may use
fewer workers if forced to pay higher wages, and any enhancement
of commerce will perpetuate the attempts of employers to keep costs
down in order to produce more goods. Secondly, Congress repeatedly
found that the language of the Act created numerous ambiguities
and inconsistencies.7 9 Hence, the demise of the FLSA has proven to
be the first stepping stone for the DOL in its advocacy of the certification system as the only reasoned alternative to a total outlaw of
homeworkers.
who should be protected. Id. at 3.
75. See supra note 16.
76. Judge Gesell, when speaking of the Dole decision, stated that "[t]he evidence is
strong that the conditions present in the 1940's regarding the exploitation of homeworkers
have not disappeared . . . [but] the regulations represented a 'reasoned' approach requiring
companies seeking to institute homework to come forward and seek certification ...." NY

Times, Dec. 8,1989, at A33, col. 1. Furthermore, the Dole court followed the DOL's belief
that "the homework ban has fostered an underground economy beyond control and the certifi-

cation program in knitted outerwear improved FLSA enforcement .
at 881.

Dole, 729 F. Supp.

77. See supra note 59.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b)(1988).
79. See S. Rep. No. 145. Congress claims that, because the groups of employees covered
under the Act remain relatively unchanged, the earnings of those workers covered by the Act
is much lower than those workers not covered. S. Rep. No. 145 at 6. Also, the Senate believes
that the Act does not cover the broad range of employees it could have otherwise covered if its
protection had extended beyond those employees involved with interstate commerce or in the
production of goods used for commerce. Id. The Senate report's amendment of 1961 attempted
to extend this coverage. Id. at 25.
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PROVES TO BE

A

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CERTIFICATION SYSTEM

A.

History and Background

Recent developments among the tax laws, particularly through
the emergence of tax deduction section 280A,80 have supported the
image of the American homeworker as a worker who needs little, if
any, governmental protection.8 1 Specifically, the trend in tax laws,
from Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter "I.R.C.") section 162,82 to
I.R.C. section 280A, 83 has been to allow certain workers to deduct
from their taxes, maintenance that is applicable to a home office.8
However, the homeworker is banned from doing so due to the language of the I.R.C., perpetuating the judicial inference of the 1980's
that the homeworker does not maintain a home-office which requires
supervision.
Throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, professors and other
professionals could deduct home office expenses through I.R.C. section 162(a). 5 The Internal Revenue Service, (hereinafter "IRS")
countered with I.R.C. section 262,86 which states in part that
"[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living or family expenses.''8
Though the language of the I.R.C. sections appears to be at a
dichotomy, cases emerged88 which would seem to enhance a
homeworker's claim that the residence is a workplace both deserving
of a home-office deduction and of governmental supervision. In Newi
v. Commissioner,8" the petitioner claimed in part, business deductions for a room utilized as a business tool in his job as an outside
salesman."0 In this room, the petitioner studied, researched and con80. 26 I.R.C. § 280A (1988).
81. See infra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
82. 26 I.R.C. § 162 (1988).
83. 26 I.R.C. § 280A (1988).
84. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1988). "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or

business .... Id. See also I.R.C. § 280(c)(1)(1988)(stating that an exception to the general
no-deduction rule is an exception allowed when the expense is allocable to an area of the
taxpayer's residence used exclusively and regularly as a place of business).
85. 26 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1988). The Code allows all deductions for money spent for "ordinary and necessary expenses" in the continuation of one's business. Id.
86. 26 I.R.C. § 262(1988).
87. 26 I.R.C. § 262(a)(1988).

88. See infra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
89. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1969), afl'd. 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970).
90. Newi, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 686.
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ducted other business-related activities. 9 The Court held that these
expenses were deductible under I.R.C. section 162, and that "the
term 'necessary' [of I.R.C. section 162] imposes only the minimal
requirement that the contested expenditure be 'appropriate and helpful' to the taxpayer's business.""2 Consequently, a homeworker need
only prove that her residence is appropriate and helpful to the performance of her work to win this deduction.93
B. Developing Tax Law of the 1980's and the Non-recognition of
the Home as a Workplace
Unfortunately, more recent decisions which have been decided
by an interpretation of the Tax Reform Act of 197691 have allowed
certain white-collar professionals to deduct maintenance expenses
while setting up new restrictions which prevent a homeworker from
claiming the same. As a general rule, "in the case of a taxpayer who
is an individual or an S corporation, no deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed with respect to the use of a
dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable year
as a residence."95 The implications of this rule is that a homeworker
would never be granted a deduction because her workplace is her
residence. However, an exception is made if the unit is "the principal
place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer .
"...96
Thus, if homeworkers were granted these deductions, their residences would be deemed workplaces and thus deserving of more
monetary protection than a certification system would ever supply;
the certification system does not call for monetary compensation for
depreciating machinery.
Nonetheless, the intricate language of the Code fails the
homeworker in her quest to label the home a workplace. The exception found in section 280A97 of the I.R.C. applies only if the place of
business and its exclusive use is for the "convenience of [the] em91. Id. at 688. The Court made special note of the fact that the room was never used for
the family's personal use. Id.
92. Id. (citing Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966)).
93. This "appropriate and helpful" test is directly against the prior Revenue Ruling 62180, which set up restrictive guidelines for when a deduction may be claimed. See Rev. Rul.
62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52. Some of the conditions were that the home-office would be a condition
of employment and that it be used only for that purpose. Id. at 53.
94. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 601(a), 990 Stat. 1520, 1569-72 (codified as amended at 26
I.R.C. § 280A (1988)).
95. I.R.C. § 280A(a)(1988).
96. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A)(1988).
97. See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A)(1988).
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ployer."'98 Thus, homeworkers remain at a distinct disadvantage in
using this law because, though the homeworkers' positions result in
the employer's convenience by allowing the employer to operate at

lower costs, 99 a more convincing argument may always be introduced
that the homeworkers are at home voluntarily and for their own convenience. Also, homeworkers must overcome the arduous argument
that expenses cannot be deducted because their homes operate only

as "residences,"' 100 and thus are deserving of deductions only under
some very strict guidelines.' 0 '
Because tax laws continue in their non-recognition of the home
as a complete workplace, and because the judiciary insinuates that
the homeworkers do not require a total ban on their work, 02 the
certification system emerges as a less-restrictive alternative to the
complete abolition of this work. In contrast, the deductions under
I.R.C. section 280A are being made readily available to white-collar
professionals, suggesting that this professional work differs clearly
from domestic service which doubles as paid employment. Though
professionals have been traditionally unsuccessful with this deduction,103 recent decisions have demonstrated that the courts are now
allowing such deductions. In Weissman v. Commissioner,0 4 a college professor attempted to obtain a home-office deduction. 0 5 The

circuit court stated that one's principal place of business "depends
on the nature of his business activities, the attributes of the space in
which such activities can be conducted, and the practical necessity of
using a home office. .. ."106 In finding that Weissman deserved the
98. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(1988).
99. See supra note 1I.
100. See I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1)(A)(1988)(stating that a residence is such if used for personal purposes for a number of days exceeding 14 days); see also I.R.C. §
280A(d)(2)(A)(1988) (stating that the unit will have personal purposes if, for any part of the
day, it is used for such or by any other member of the family for this purpose).
101. Aside from the general restrictions set up by the language of the Code, other limitations exist which impose hardship on this quest for a deduction. See, e.g., I.R.C. §
280A(d)(2)(1988)(commenting that it is the Secretary's decision to judge what constitutes
continuous repairs and maintenance in regards to personal use for purposes of the Code).
102. See generally Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 886-88; 53 Fed. Reg. 45706-45727 (1989).
103. See generally Weightman v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 167 (1982) (holding that, because the university offered the professor an office where work could be conducted,
and although his home office was exclusively relegated to schoolwork, the court could not conclude that it was his principal place of business); Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH)
686 (1969)(holding that certain personal expenses, such as tips, cab fares, and office maintenance could not be deducted though spent in the course of business).
104. 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520 (1983), rev'd, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984).
105. Weissman, 751 F.2d at 514.
106. Id.
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deduction, the circuit court held that the convenience-of-employer
test' 0 7 was satisfied because the cost of the office was additionalto
living expenses, and its use was necessary as practicality dictated. 08

So, although these professionals find relief in I.R.C. section 280A,
homeworkers will find it nearly impossible to separate any working
area from living area, 09 and to prove that depreciation of home supplies is due to employee-related work and not to normal domestic
wear and tear.

Finally, the tax courts often consider whether the individual
uses the office area exclusively as an office, 1 0 a privilege not shared
by the rural homeworker; she often shares the workplace with children and a spouse."' More importantly, I.R.C. section 280A has
often been used for home-office deductions and not as a route
through which domestic services can be deducted. It is evident why
the court in Dole did not persist to keep the ban on homeworkers so
strictly enforced; historic tax laws do not regard the homeworker's
places of business, mainly their residences, as official American
workplaces."'
V. AFDC

GRANTS CONTINUE TO PERPETUATE THE
HOMEWORKER'S STATUS

A.

Background

In contrast to I.R.C. section 280A, 113 grants known as Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (hereinafter "AFDC")"' are provided to those families that may easily include a homeworker as a
member." 5 Unlike I.R.C. section 280A, AFDC is directly applicable
to homeworkers.1 6 Unfortunately, the new laws and case decisions
107. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
108. Weissman, 751 F.2d at 516 (emphasis added).
109. The homeworker generally works within her own home and usually does not have a
formal office within.
110. See, e.g., Meiers v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (1984), rev'd, 781 F.2d
75, 79 (7th Cir. 1986) (listing factors relevant to this issue as pertaining to a home office, and
not just a place to work as a matter of convenience); Fiorelli, The Home Office Deduction
After Weissman. New Hope for Faculty?, 24 Am. Bus. L.J. 377, 401 (1986) (claiming that the

Meiers court looked at factors such as length of time in the home office and its business necessity to conclude that the taxpayer deserved a deduction).
Ill. See supra note 109.
112. See supra notes 90-112 and accompanying text.
113. 26 I.R.C. § 280A (1988).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988).
115. See McGrath, supra note 11, at 39 (including as homeworkers many mothers and
rural residents).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1988) (describing AFDC as a plan to supply benefits to
needy families with children).
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concerning these grants perpetuate the recipients' poverty and encourage many homeworker-recipients to remain silent about both
their jobs and income derived from that position. 1 In 1981, 34.6
percent of all households headed solely by a woman were at a poverty level," 8 while only 10.3 percent of those homes headed solely by
a man were at this level." 9 More importantly, 81.8 percent of
AFDC grants were received by female-headed households, 20 a distinguishing characteristic shared by many families which include a
homeworker as a member.' 2 '
Recent legislative amendments concerning the amount of money
deducted from the AFDC grant prove detrimental to any encouragement extended to these homeworkers to seek higher-paying, safer
jobs. In 1981, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 22 (hereinafter "OBRA") was passed. In effect, this Act states that those receiving AFDC grants must disregard from their earned income "the first
$75 of the total$75
of such earned income for such month . . ."123 and

shall disregard from earned income any care for a dependent child
that does not exceed $160.124 Thus, the "OBRA successfully reduced
the benefits paid to many AFDC recipients

. . .

by placing a statu-

tory ceiling on the amount of work-related expenses which may be
excluded from AFDC recipients' reported income.' 2 The effect of
the OBRA will dissuade many poorer family members, and many
homeworkers, from seeking a better job because these individuals
wish to maintain the maximum benefit of their respective AFDC
grants. 2 6 Any increase in reported income earned by a former
homeworker raises the risk that a grant will be reduced or terminated altogether, and forces such workers to remain in their present
working conditions.
117.
118.
Jonah M.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
Note, Working Women on AFDC, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 308 (1984) (authored by
Staller).
Id.
Id.
McGrath, supra note 1, at 39.
42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii)(1988).
42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(8)(A)(iii)(1988).
Note, supra note 118, at 309.
Before the enactment of OBRA, an AFDC recipient could deduct "all work-related

expenses, child care expenses, mandatory payroll deductions, and an additional work incentive

deduction" from his income total that was reported to determine if he possessed the criteria to
receive aid. Note, supra note 118, at 310. OBRA then severely limited these deductions from
one's earned income and consequently lowered the number of workers eligible for the AFDC
grant. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988).
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Court Decisions Encourage Public Policy of Employment and
thus Discourage Homeworkersfrom Seeking Better Jobs

Court decisions following the enactment of the OBRA demonstrate the courts' willingness to further the legislative goal of encouraging people to work and dissuading the use of welfare as a means of

income; 127 to enable more people to work, the certification system
must be allowed to prevail over the possibility that all homeworkers

would otherwise be unemployed and be back on welfare as their only
income. In Turner v. Prod,'28 the court for the ninth circuit origi-

nally went against a trend "to reduce significantly the benefits payable to working AFDC recipients by penalizing poor women for receiving income which they never see . .. 129 and held that
"'income' for AFDC purposes does not include mandatory payroll
withholding for items such as local, state, and federal income taxes,
FICA, state disability, and equivalent governmental programs."'' 0
This decision was critical, because if the state were to consider

mandatory payroll deductions as a work expense, a monthly $75 cutoff would be calculated, instead of a total deduction, and the aid to

these families would then be greatly reduced.' 3 ' Nevertheless, the
Turner decision was overruled by the Supreme Court in Heckler v.
Turner, a2 where the Court based its decision in part on the theory
that "the risk of creating disincentives to employment that would
lead to increased expenditures down the road did not trouble the

OBRA Congress."'

33

Consequently, the Supreme Court believed

that to allow decreased expenditures would be an inexcusable intru34
sion into clearly-stated legislative policy.'

Other courts have held that the mandatory payroll deduction is
127. See Ram v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). One policy that encouraged
Congress to enact OBRA was to create "incentives to AFDC recipient families to obtain employment in lieu of continued reliance on AFDC benefits." Ram, 564 F. Supp. at 646.
128. 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 184 (1984).
129. Note, supra note 118, at 310.
130. Turner, 707 F.2d at 1124.
131. Turner, 707 F.2d at 1111-12. If a woman earned $576.20 per month, and had
$59.52 deducted for taxes, her actual available income would be $516.68. Id. Then, she would
have still $75.00 left to deduct for work expense, giving her almost $442 as income. Id. This
amount would then be subtracted from an overall benefit level, and the remainder would be
her AFDC grant. Id. However, if the Turner court did not rule as it did, the recipient's grant
would have been calculated as $576.00 minus a mandatory $75.00 to leave $501.00. Id. Then
the recipient would have only $15.00 for work expense, the rest taken from her personal
pocket, and the $501.00 is subtracted from the state benefit level, resulting in an AFDC grant
much lower than the Turner circuit court could allow. Id.
132. 470 U.S. 184 (1984).
133. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 206.
134. Id.
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not part of "income" to determine AFDC grants and have steadily
tightened the hold of the homeworkers' plight by significantly lowering the grants available to AFDC families. In James v. O'Bannon,'135
the court for the third circuit faced the same dilemma as was found
in Turner. In the James case, however, the court stated that "[t]he
AFDC program is designed to provide financial assistance to needy
dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with and
care for them,"' 36 and "to help such parents or relatives 'to attain or
retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental
care and protection.' "137 The James court further stated that Congress' original policy of helping recipients to gain self-sufficiency and
creating an incentive to work' 38 has given way to a more modern
policy to reduce welfare benefits to those not as needy as others, and
to make jobs available as an alternative to aid. 39 Consequently, the
government's departure from overall aid, and its movement towards
a limited monetary system, serve to foster a situation where a worker
may not seek more income so that as much aid can be received.
Furthermore, the fourth circuit in Bell v. Massinga4 ° agreed
with the third circuit in James and held that "AFDC eligibility and
benefits on the basis of income [are to be determined] before taxes,
except to the extent that such taxes may be included in a statutory
'disregard' of $75 per month."'' Also, the Bell court agreed to remain in line with the policies of Congress. 42 Inevitably, a
homeworker's existence relies in part on the income derived from
working in the home that would otherwise be impossible to earn, 43
and the AFDC grants serve to enhance a homeworker's low-income
status.
It is apparent that the movement, in the mid-1980's, towards
treating work expenses as part of a payroll, continues to perpetuate
the dire situation of the homeworkers and clearly indicates how the
courts and Congress perceive an outright ban to homeworkers as a
135.
136.
137.
138.

715 F.2d 794 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985).
James, 715 F.2d at 808 (quoting Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1984)).
Id., at 808 (quoting Shea, 416 U.S. at 253 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 601)).
See James, 715 F.2d at 808.

139. Id. at 809.
140.
141.

721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1984).
Bell, 721 F.2d at 132.

142. Id. at 133. "[l]t was the intent of Congress in enacting OBRA that henceforth
gross income was to be the starting point for determining AFDC eligibility and benefits
.
... Id.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iii)(1988) (stating that the cost of day-care for
young children should be disregarded, not allowing a deduction in income).
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viable threat to their policies of better employment and self-suffiA worker who earns below-minimum wage,145 or just
ciency.
barely so, is not likely to agree that the mandatory $75 cut-off is for
her personal benefit and is a sufficient incentive to seek other work.
What the courts have done is to respond to a growing number of
recipients who require a proportionally decreasing amount of aid,
and allow Congress to influence their holdings of who is the neediest.1 46 Homeworkers will not search for better employment, when
outside work expenses they may encounter, such as travel money,
food money, and child care would not be taken into account when
the needed AFDC grant is calculated.1 47 Clearly at a disadvantage,
poor homeworkers on AFDC grants will not leave the home now that
expenses may not be repaid. So, if courts regard these workers as
self-sufficient in their present condition, the Dole Court cannot be
faulted for following Congressional policy and believing that these
workers, who are employed and demonstrate the government's goal
of employment, are also so sufficient as not to require a complete ban
on the work they accomplish.
VI. THE OCCUPATIONAL
FLSA, LEAVE No DOUBT

SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT, AND THE
THAT THE CERTIFICATION SYSTEM IS
THE ONLY EXISTING LEGAL PROCEDURAL REGULATION

A.

OSHA Fails as a Safety Net

Due to the changing policies of the courts and Congress, the
homeworker is thrust into a situation where she lacks legal standing
to sue under numerous health and safety acts. Consequently, the certification system arises as the only "reasoned approach" to the lack
of statutes affecting the homeworkers. For example, homeworkers
lack the legal recourse to sue under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act 48 (hereinafter "OSHA"). Upon its inception, OSHA reinforced the notion that an implicit right of refusal existed for all
non-unionized individual employees to work in an unsafe environ144. An outright ban on homeworkers could potentially result in thousands of more individuals requesting governmental aid. As Congress and the courts interpret OBRA, they consistently adhere to legislative histories of self-sufficiency and hard work. See supra notes 12739 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 10 (discussing the average wage of homeworkers).
146. See, e.g., Ram v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)(discussing the
policies of the 97th Congress and inferring that courts should adhere to these policies in their
decision-making process).
147. See James, 715 F.2d at 797-98.
148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
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ment.' 49 OSHA thus reinforced the trend of the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB") "to include the isolated acts of
individual employees in both the unionized and nonunionzied workplace

.

."

5'

within the protective realm of the National Labor Re-

lations Act
(hereinafter "NLRA"). The references to "interstate
commerce" and "every working person" also infer that OSHA reflects the language of the Fair Labor Standards Act' 52 and presents
the possibility that homeworkers may sue under OSHA to seek relief. Moreover, the judicial trend throughout the 1970's appeared to
pave the way finally for homeworkers to seek relief from exploitative
employers, declaring that a collective bargaining agreement was
deemed irrelevant to the safety issue of a worker.15 3
Numerous problems have arisen, however, regarding the OSHA
and its applicability to homeworkers. One such problem is the
Board's decision in Meyers Industries,Inc. v. Prill.54 In Meyers, the
Board overruled the Alleluia Cushion Co. case and declared that the
NLRA protects only concerted activity, and that an individual's actions must be on behalf of fellow employees in order to be pro55
tected.

56

Thus, the Board rejects the notion that section 7 of the

NLRA was intended to protect individual action, 57 even where an
employee refuses to work in favor of his own safety as was the issue
in Meyers. 58 A homeworker now cannot seek redress for unsafe conditions, as a homeworker most likely would not be acting on the be149. OSHA states in pertinent part that "Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to,
interstate commerce.
...
OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 651(a)(1988). Furthermore, "[t]he Congress
declares it to be its purpose and policy . . . to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.
...
29 U.S.C. § 651(a)(1988).
150. Note, Individual Safety Protest in the Nonunion Workplace: Hazardous Decisions
Under Hazardous Conditions, 89 DICK. L. REv. 207, 208 (1984-85)(emphasis supplied)(authored by Kenneth Lasch Smukler).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988).
152. See supra note 59.
153. See Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975). "[T]he Board turned to
[OSHA] and similar legislation at the state and local level which indicated that safety was a
concern common to all employees and found the existence or nonexistence of a collective bargaining agreement to be immaterial." Note, supra note 150, at 218 (citing to Alleluia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000).
154. 268 N.L.R.B. 27,290 (1984).
155. Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 27,294.
156. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations.
...
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 26 U.S.C. §152 (1988).
157. Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 27,296.
158. In Meyers, the petitioner was afraid to drive a vehicle he believed to be damaged.
Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 27,295. Thereafter, the employee was discharged. Id.
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half of fellow homeworkers.'" 9
In addition to court decisions, the language of the OSHA and
the NLRA severely hampers the ability of homeworkers to sue for

safer conditions, without fear of discharge or recrimination. Through
the OSHA, an employee cannot be discharged for filing a complaint
derived from this statute. 16 0 However, homeworkers do not appear to

fall within the definition of "employee" under the NLRA' 6 ' or under

the OSHA. Thus, homeworkers arguably are not protected by the

Board, and may fear recrimination without the protection of union
representation, a strong bargaining position, or the supervision of the
Board. Even assuming that the OSHA's definition of "employee"
need not correspond to that of the NLRA, and the OSHA does offer
homeworkers protection as employees, homeworkers may prove to be

dangerously unknowledgeable of the OSHA rules. Consequently,
when OSHA allows thirty days to file a complaint, 62 "[there is a
danger that unwary nonunion employees . . . may lose valuable

time, and may find themselves outside the limitations period."' 63 In a
situation where the Secretary of Labor investigates a wrong under

the rules for the certification system, a homeworker may not know
that this thirty-day limit has begun. If the Secretary does not find a
wrong

after

using

the certification

system's

procedure,

the

homeworker may have already forfeited her right to sue under the
OSHA because the statute of limitations has already run out. Again,
the certification system emerges as the only decisive procedural
method in which a homeworker may find legal haven.
159. The homeworker's actions are often personal and are a result of remaining at home
to care for children, etc. Boris, supra note 6, at 30.
160. See OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1988). "No person shall discharge or in any manner
discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted
29 U.S.C.
or cause to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter .
§660(c)(1)(1988).
161.

See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).

The term 'employee' . . . shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person . . . or any
individual having the status of an independent contractor . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 152(3)(1988). Many homeworkers are in a domestic service and are often classias independent contractors, declassifying them as "employees" under the Act.
fied
162.

See OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2)(1988).

163.

Note, supra note 150, at 227.
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B.

FLSA and its Zone of Interest Leave Homeworkers Without
Any Legal Recourse Other Than Certification

In being left devoid of any legal recourse by which to sue,
homeworkers remain classified as workers whose dire situation is
greatly exaggerated and whose work is neither dangerous nor a requisite for Congressional regulation. Nowhere is the advocacy for the
certification system better exemplified than through the ever-changing language of the FLSA. Under the FLSA, manufacturers, their
associations, and labor organizations are allowed to bring suit,'6 4 all
three of these categories falling within FLSA's "zone of interest.' 6
Moreover, the FLSA's protective targets have been expanded to include not only homeworkers but their employers as well. 66 In this
ambiguous and legal conflict, the Secretary of Labor must insure
that "any competing interests of these parties are resolved . . . in a
rational manner, and that the Act is rationally enforced ..
"1 7
Finally, as homeworkers struggle to maintain a legal safety net, the
FLSA again takes away their power by allowing the Secretary to
preempt an employee's suit if the case is related to overtime
wages, 168 but does not preempt a case brought by an employer. It
appears that the FLSA misleadingly insinuates that it is readily
available to homeworkers as a defense against wrongful employers;
in reality, the FLSA has been expanded to accommodate management and has squeezed out homeworkers who were meant to originally benefit from the act. 6 9 In turn, the certification system
emerges as a way to regulate an area that has been swept from the
FLSA's reach.
As a consequence of these legislative changes and the relaxation
of the FLSA's "zone of interest,""70 the certification system has be164. See Donovan, 722 F.2d at 810.
165. See Donovan, 722 F.2d at 809-10 (holding that the FLSA's zones of interests include those people disadvantaged by any action which comes within the FLSA's meaning).
166. "In contrast, it is clear that the Fair Labor Standards Act was intended to protect
compliant employers and their employees as well as underpaid employees." Donovan, 722
F.2d
at 810 n. 23.
167. Id.
168. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1988). "The right provided by this subsection to bring an action
by or on behalf of any employee . . . shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by
the
Secretary of Labor in an action . . . in which restraint is sought of any further delay in
the
payment of unpaid minimum wages.
... 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988).
169. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
170. See generally Cooper & Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 679 F.2d 951, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(holding that the Supreme Court often rejected
objections to a plaintiff's lack of standing though, if used, the zone of interest test would
have
proved otherwise); Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283, 289 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
de-
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come the inevitable "reasoned approach" to a total ban on homeworkers, as this system is the only regulatory system that has not
been modified and undermined by the courts and legislature. For the

zone of interest, "[t]he Supreme Court cases require no more than a
showing that there is a 'substantial likelihood' that the relief re-

quested will redress the injury,"' 71 though the "[p]laintiff need not

prove that granting the requested relief is certain to alleviate the
injury. ' 17 2 Homeworkers may argue rightfully that they are covered
by the FLSA, but the relief requested cannot be higher wages or
better conditions because the piece-rate given for their work is often
fixed before employment,' 73 and their own homes manifest their
working conditions. In effect, the relief that would most likely redress their wrongs would be a certification system, because this sys17
and
tem would subject employers to the discipline of the DOL
would identify homeworkers as its sole targets to protect. The court
system again has produced a way in which both homeworkers' concerns and their employers' actions are answerable only to this system
set up by the Department of Labor.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The snowball effect that began with the demise of the FLSA
must be abruptly halted. To do so, the courts must reassess their
stances on the certification system, a system that has survived years
of speculation and abuse.
Perhaps due to its tenacity to survive, the certification system
may be a positive idea that can be salvaged with needed changes.
Instead of a voluntary certification, the employer's registration
should be made mandatory. With the money that the employer undoubtedly saves by not paying overhead, etc., the certification should
be accompanied with a payment to each homeworker that would aid
this worker with child care or work-related expenses; this payment
would seldom be a burden to these employers. Furthermore, the
'
piece-rate system that often results in unbelievably low wages
nied, 454 U.S. 881 (198 1)(holding that the test's changing nature makes its application challenging and an interpretation somewhat impossible).
171. Lever Bros. Co. v. Maurer, 712 F. Supp. 645, 648 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (citing Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)).
172. Lever Bros., 712 F. Supp. at 648 (citing Donovan, 722 F.2d at 795).
173. See McGrath, supra note 11, at 38 (claiming that, even with overtime and persistent effort, a homeworker's wages remained at a piece-rate wage).

174. See Dole, 729 F. Supp. at 881-88.
175. See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 11, at 38 (explaining that at piece-rate, a worker
may receive $2.25 per shirt and $2.00 per pants, but that sewing full-time still only yields
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should be replaced with a standard minimum wage, payable per
hour, because the quantity and type of work should not determine
the wages received, and it is these options created for the employer
which create the opportunity for abuse.
Without these changes, the decision in ILGWU v. Dole is certain to be just another effect within a snowballing set of changes.
"Most significantly, homework as it currently exists is the symptom,
not the cause, of economic exploitation."' 76 More specifically, "home
work is a device that severs benefits from jobs, lowering the overall
wage bill.' 1 77 Not surprisingly, in 1988, there were nine states that
still lacked a minimum wage program' 78 and most were rural states
and were recipients of many of the nation's immigrants and minorities. This situation is clearly indicative of the economic exploitation
that will persist as long as the job market cannot accommodate
workers, 7 9 and the courts and government insist that a certification
system is better than no homework at all. Evidently, the arguments
against a ban were destroyed by an avalanche of judicial decisions
and Congressional acts 8 0 which created the misleading image that a
ban would be counterproductive to a situation whose wrongs were
exaggerated by lobbyists (feminists, unions, etc.).' 81 Moreover,
though homeworkers are great in number, 8 2 their plight may soon
be outshadowed by the plight of technical and clerical homeworkers, 8 3 thus leaving homeworkers without any regulation at all, save
for the certification system. When the FLSA is practically deemed
obsolete and recent amendments only protect employers, when the
courts create a system by which homeworkers cannot sue readily for
their own health and safety, and when tax courts insinuate that these
people need an incentive to work and are self-sufficient due to this
annual incomes which hover around $5,200).
176. Boris, supra note 6, at 30.
177. Id.
178. See Nordlund, supra note 24, at 715 n.1 (listing Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Iowa,

Louisianna, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and Tennessee as states devoid of minimum
wage laws).

179.

A recent investigation brought up 7,000 cases of children working in illegal envi-

ronments. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1990, at A16. Also, these children are often working
in
sweatshop atmospheres and are completing work normally done by adults. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 5,
1990, at BI. Though those individuals exploited are children, these environments and
lack of
protection parallel those found within the homeworker setting.
180. See supra parts II to V and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 10-13.

182. See McGrath, supra note 11, at 38 (stating that a conservative estimate of home-

workers equals nearly 150,000 in the United States).
183. These workers could total ten million by the early 1990's. McGrath, supra note
1.
at 41.
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work, a judge would have no choice but to follow this domino effect
and allow the certification system to prevail.
Laura Helene Gonshorek
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